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L. DIANE TURNER,
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UTAH ORTHOPAEDIC ASSOCIATES & ]| Case No. 930187-CA
SPORTS MEDICINE CLINIC,
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]

Defendants.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

JURISDICTION STATEMENT
Jurisdiction
pursuant

to

is conferred
Utah

Code

upon The

Utah Court

Annotated,

§

of Appeals

78-2-2

(3)(j)

(1992).
ISSUE FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue for review is whether or not the trial court judge
abused her

discretion in ruling that Dr. Robert Home, M.D. had

never agreed
M.D., for

to act as Plaintiff's expert,

the first

time

Plaintiff that he would

on September

and since Dr. Home,

11, 1992

not act as such expert,
1

indicated

to

the trial court

judge

abused her discretion

for a

continuance of

which to designate

in not

her trial,

granting Plaintiff's motion
and an

extension of time

a replacement expert. The

in

standard of review

is whether or not the court's decision was clearly erroneous.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
No

determinative law

case are not on point
Case,

under

the

has been found

as the

with cases that have been

facts

herein,

is one

of

facts of this

discovered. The

first

impression.

Instructive cases are cited.
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
The surprise event of Dr. Home, M.D., Plaintiff's
treating

physician/surgeon, claiming he

doing so

for the

cutoff date had

first

time after

would not

testify, and

the designation

of

expert

passed, was an event beyond Plaintiff's control,

and Plaintiff should have been allowed to continue the

trial and

replace such designated expert.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE ABUSED
HER DISCRETION IN NOT ALLOWING
PLAINTIFF TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL
AND DESIGNATE A NEW EXPERT TO
REPLACE THE DESIGNATED EXPERT
WHO, AT THE LAST INSTANCE,
DECIDED NOT TO TESTIFY.
The trial Court has substantial discretion in deciding
whether to grant continuances. Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d
1375, at 1377 (Utah 1988). In the case before the bar, it is
clear that Plaintiff properly and timely designated her expert
witness on July 31, 1992 pursuant to Court order. It is also
2

clear that Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel learned for the
first time,

after

designation of

expert

and discovery

dates had passed, that Plaintiff's designated
Home, M.D., was going to refuse to

expert, Dr. Robert

testify for Plaintiff. Such

refusal of Plaintiff's designated

expert to testify was

on

six

September

designation of
that

11,

or Defendant's

expert

without

knowledge or consent and
designated

weeks

after

learned

the

expert

experts deadline had passed. Further, it is clear

Defendant,

designated

1992, nearly

cutoff

expert

counsel,

Plaintiff's

contacted Plaintiff's

or

Plaintiff's counsel

obtained an affidavit from

stating

that

he

would

not

Plaintiff's

testify

for

Plaintiff. (See Affidavit of Dr. Robert Home, M.D., as attached
to Defendant's Statement of Points and Authorities in

Support of

Motion for Summary Judgement; and see also Affidavit of
Turner, as attached to Plaintiff's Response

L. Diane

to Defendants Motion

for Summary Judgment)•
Plaintiff's only alternative as a result of this surprise
event was to move for a continuance of the scheduled trial date,
and to move for an extension of time in which to designate an
expert to replace Dr. Home. Plaintiff requested that she be
allowed

ninety (90) days in

expert. The

trial

continuance

should have

(Plaintiff
Plaintiff's

was

which to

and

replacement

scheduled

for November

30,

been for

a reasonable

period

suggested 90 days)
expert,

designate a

to allow

thereafter

designated expert by Defendant.
3

for

for the
the

1992. The
of time

designation of

deposing of

the

Further,

the trial court

the deposition
was

testimony of

testimony

intended

showing

to testify

presumably based
Plaintiff that

Plaintiff's

in her

her decision on

Defendants asserted

designated

expert

behalf. Plaintiff's

deposition was

taken by Defendants on January 23, 1992. Defendants took
lines

from Plaintiff's testimony,

ever,

criticized

Dr. McQueen.

accurate.

The

Defendants
testimony
14.
fired

deposition
two

to see that

(2)

were taken

lines

of

testimony

out of context,

are Plaintiff's

relied

the full

do is

questions in

such a proposition

being found on page 76, line

These pages

Dr. Home,

All one need

look at the full context of the preceding series of
Plaintiff's

two (2)

(Plaintiff's Deposition, page

81, lines 9 and 10), and propose from that testimony
M.D. never,

never

was not
upon

by

context of the

9, through page 81, line

testimony concerning

when she

Dr. McQueen and hired Dr* Home, and an explanation of how

Dr. Home immediately put her in the hospital and operated on her
knee. Her testimony was that Dr. Home, at the time of that first
visit

with

Plaintiff's

Dr.

Home,

never

Deposition, page

criticized
76, lines

Dr.

McQueen,

9-25, through

(See,

page 81,

lines 1-14).
Defendants also took three (3) other deposition
testimony lines, i.e., page 96, lines 23-25, for

the proposition

that no medical experts have been critical of Dr. McQueen.
Plaintiff's testimony, by deposition, was taken on January 23,
1992, experts were not designated until July 31, 1992. At the
time of Plaintiff's deposition Plaintiff did not consider Dr.
4

Home to be anything other than her treating physician.
Additionally, Plaintiff, personally, had not talked to any other
medical experts specifically on the issue of whether or not Dr.
McQueen had committed malpractice as of January 23, 1992.
On several occasions during Dr. Home's care of Plaintiff he
made comments to her, and there are comments in some of his
reports that illustrate his concern that proper care by Dr.
McQueen was not given. (See# Exhibit "B"# to Plaintiff's Response
To Defendants Motion For Summary Judgment,
14-89,

from Dr. Home,

Plaintiff's Response To
November

20,

Discharge Summary, 7-

[highlighted sections];

Exhibit "C", to

Defendants Motion For Summary

1991 letter

from

Dr.

Home to

Judgment,

Social

Security

Administration commenting on secondary infection after
first

[McQueen]

surgery;

and,

Exhibit

Response To Defendants Motion For Summary
1990

letter

from

Dr.

Exhibits, "B", "C", and
Home's first
nearly

two

Home

to

"D", to

Judgment, February 24,

Hartford

Insurance). Those

"D", were over a period of time from Dr.

visit/surgery through

late in 1991, a period

and

one-half

years. Through

Plaintiff states

that Dr.

Home

all

the "secondary infection"

knee that precipitated

her problems,

allowing the

open

wound

of

either directly

clearly inferred, that

McQueen

Plaintiff's

on

that

time,

told her,

or

in Plaintiff#s

was the result
her knee

of

to

stay

of Dr.
open.

Plaintiff had reasonably relied upon the fact that
her surgeon and treating physician, Dr. Home, would testify as
to those events and causes, as he had stated to her from the
5

beginning. The first time Dr. Home said he would not testify

is

in his September 11, 1992 letter to Plaintiff's attorney, such
time being approximately one and one-half months after the
deadline for expert designation, and two and one-half months
before the scheduled trial.
The

cases

set

forth

Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309
761 P.2d 1375 (Utah
v. Leisure Sports

in

the

Addendum,

i.e..

v.

(Utah Ap. 1992); Christenson v. Jewkes,

1988); Charlie Brown Construction
Incorporated, 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah

Maxfield v. Fishier,

Hill

Co., Inc.
App. 1987);

538 P.2d 1323; and Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d

917 (Utah App. 1989), are all instructive,

but none are on point

with the facts of the instant case. They can all be distinguished
in

that none

of

those cases

involved

a factual

circumstance

where, as here, (1) no continuances had been previously requested
by

Plaintiff;

(2)

Plaintiff

had

not

disobeyed

any

court

scheduling or other order; (3) a timely designated expert who was
also

Plaintiff's treating

physician

and

surgeon had,

Plaintiff's knowledge, supplied an affidavit
saying

he

would

not

Plaintiff's counsel by
not testify;

testify,

and

letter for the

(4) Defendants

knew

on

to opposing counsel

the

same

date inform

first time that

who

without

Plaintiff's

he would
designated

expert was and didn't attempt to depose him until September, when
at

that

same

time,

Defendant

obtained

Plaintiff's expert, without informing

an

affidavit

from

Plaintiff that contact was

going to be made with Plaintiff's designated expert.
Hill v. Dickerson

is instructive in
6

that the Plaintiff

in

Dlckerson had previously asked
the trial
to

for and obtained continuances

based upon not having a

timely

Scheduling

respond

to

Order,

and

continuance.

In the

designated expert, had failed

discovery,
orally

and was

instant case,

moving

designation cutoff

had

violated

moved

continuances, timely and pursuant
expert

toward

of

the

the

court's

for

another

asked

for no

court

Plaintiff had

to court order designated

trial

when,

after

the

her

expert

date Plaintiff's expert supplies an affidavit

to Defendants stating he would not testify for Plaintiff.

It was

at that point in time that Plaintiff requested for the first time
a continuance

and

the opportunity

to

designate a

replacement

expert.
None of the circumstances that existed in the Dickerson case
existed

in the instant

Dickerson

case

supported

the finding

case, and yet

suggests

that

that the

discretion in dismissing the
Defendant would
even

taken

announced he

it

not have

Plaintiff's

a careful

was

those

trial court

reading of the

conditions

did not

case with prejudice. In

been prejudiced as
expert's

deposition

would not testify. A continuance

and designation of another expert

abuse its
this case,

Defendant had
when

that

the

not

expert

of the trial date

would have visited no hardship

or prejudice upon Defendants in this case.
CONCLUSION
Since none
existed

of

the conditions

in the Dickerson

other cited

case, or

existed

that existed

cases, the court erred in
7

in this

case

in any

that

of the

dismissing this case with

prejudice

without granting

the

Plaintiff

the

opportunity

to

replace her designated expert. The case should be remanded to the
trial court with
which to

the instruction to

designate

her

expert

allow Plaintiff 90

and allow

Defendants

days in
to

take

his/her deposition# before trial.

Dated this l<Q day of May, 1993.

J. Ray Bar
Attorney f

s, Jr., P.
Plaintiff/Appellee
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examined, even if they occur outside Utah.
See Tummurru,
802 P.2d at 718-19.
Here, CBI's customers intended to purchase fully assembled tanks permanently
installed on real estate. Whether that real
estate was located in this or another state
is not relevant as to CBI's status as a real
property contractor.
CBI also argues that imposing Utah
sales tax on CBI's purchases of steel materials in Utah subjects CBI to taxation by
two states on the same transaction, that is,
taxation by Utah and taxation by the state
where the tanks are installed. CBI contends that this amounts to double taxation
in violation of the commerce clause of the
United States Constitution.
In support of its position, CBI relies on
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430
U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 51 L.Ed.2d 326
(1977), and Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S.
252, 109 S.Ct. 582, 102 L.Ed.2d 607 (1989).
In our view, those cases do not control the
issue here. Those cases dealt with the
constitutionality of different types of taxes
that call into play different legal principles.
Complete Auto Transit involved a Mississippi statute that imposed a tax "for the
privilege of . . . doing business" in the
state. The company that the state taxed
was engaged in interstate commerce. The
United States Supreme Court upheld Mississippi's tax and overruled an earlier case,
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor,
340 U.S. 602, 71 S.Ct. 508, 95 L.Ed. 573
(1951), which held that a state tax on the
privilege of doing business was per se unconstitutional when applied to interstate
commerce. Cases following Complete
Auto have established a four-part test for
determining when a tax will be sustained
against a commerce clause challenge:
[A] state tax will withstand scrutiny under the Commerce Clause if "[(1)] the
tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State,
[ (2) ] is fairly apportioned, [ (3) ] does not
discriminate against interstate commerce, and [ (4) ] is fairly related to the
services provided by the State."
Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. at 257, 109
S.Ct. at 586 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279, 97 S.Ct. at 1079).

[8] This test does not apply to the instant case because Utah did not tax an outof-state transaction or even a transaction in
interstate commerce. See McLeod v. J.E.
Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 64 S.Ct 1023,
88 L.Ed. 1304 (1944). The transactions
Utah taxed were CBI's purchases of steel
materials from Utah vendors. The transactions occurred solely within this state, and
the goods that were subject to the transactions were all used within the state by the
taxpayer. Utah did not tax the use of a
particular product manufactured outside
the state but used within the state, see,
e.g., D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486
U.S. 24, 108 S.Ct. 1619, 100 L.Ed.2d 21
(1988), nor did it tax a sale in another state.
The installation of the finished tanks in
other states does not affect the local nature of the sales transactions, nor does it
make CBI's purchase of materials in Utah
subject to apportionment, even though CBI
paid a use tax to the state where the tanks
were assembled and installed.
CBI argues that because California may
impose a use tax when the tanks are installed in California, imposition of the Utah
sales tax may result in double taxation.
This argument is based on a 1941 California Supreme Court ruling that steel materials purchased by CBI from out-of-state
sources for use in the fabrication of tanks
in California or for inventory for use in
California as business required were subject to the California use tax. Chicago
Bridge & Iron Co. v. Johnson, 19 Cal.2d
162, 119 P.2d 945 (1941) (per curiam).
[9] The short answer to CBI's argument lies in the Multistate Tax Compact
Both Utah and California are members of
the Multistate Tax Commission, and both
have adopted the Multistate Tax Compact
Utah Code Ann. § 59-22-1 (1974 & Supp.
1985) (currently codified at Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-1-801 (1987)); Cal.Rev. & Tax.Code
§§ 38001, 38006 (West 1979 & Supp.1992).
Article V of the Compact provides:
Elements of Sales and Use
Tax Laws Tax Credit
1. Each purchaser liable for a use tax
on tangible personal property shall be

HILL •. DICKERSON

Utah
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entitled to full credit for the combined law or rule" merely on a letter written to a
amount or amounts of legally imposed taxpayer asserting the Commission's posisales or use taxes paid by him with re- tion on an arguable question of law. The
spect to the same property to another Commission's letter did not constitute a
State and any subdivision thereof. The rule or law, and CBI's disregard of the
credit shall be applied first against the letter did not, therefore, constitute an inamount of any use tax due the State, and tentional disregard of the law. In our
any unused portion of the credit shall view, the dispute as to CBI's liability for
then be applied against the amount of sales taxes was a good faith dispute, even
any use tax due a subdivision.
though CBI's position was wrong. WhethUnder this article, California, in imposing a e r a taxpayer is a real property contractor
use tax, must give credit against that tax for sales tax purposes usually is fact sensifor any Utah sales tax levied, since "prece- tive. The issue in this case turned on facts
dence in liability shall prevail over prece- that reasonably support either party's posidence in payment." Resolution of Multi- tion. In addition, the taxes were imposed
state Tax Commission (1980). According- for transactions that occurred beginning
ly, the imposition of the Utah sales tax in October 1, 1983, five months before the
this case should not result in double taxa- date of the letter. In short, the Commistion. If it does, the remedy lies in the state sion erred in imposing the penalty.
that seeks to impose a tax having that
The tax assessment is affirmed. The
effect.
imposition of the penalty is reversed.
PENALTY
CBI asserts that the Commission erred in
imposing a 15% penalty pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 5^-1-^0l(3)(b) (1987). That
provision states, "If any underpayment of
tax is due to intentional disregard of law or
rule, the penalty is 15% of the underpayment." The Commission ruled that CBI
was guilty of "intentional disregard of law
or rule as made known to it by way of the
letter from the Commission dated February
29, 1984."
Although CBI did not comply with the
Commission's demand in the February 29
letter, we do not believe that constituted an
"intentional disregard of law or rule" as
that term is used by the statute. When the
letter was sent, CBI's status as a real
property contractor was arguable. Indeed,
the Commission states in its brief, "The
letter evidences a long standing disagreement between the Auditing Division and
Petitioner regarding Utah sales tax."

HALL, CJ., HOWE, Associate CJ., and
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
(o

| KEY NUMMt SYSTEM!

Gina M. HILL, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Dr. Carl DICKERSON, Defendant
and Appellee.
No. 920271-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Oct. 9, 1992.

Patient filed dental malpractice suit
against dentist. The First District Court,
Box Elder County, W. Brent West, J., dis1101 The Utah tax laws establish proce- missed patient's case with prejudice, and
dures for resolving good faith disputes be- she appealed. The Court of Appeals, Rustween the Commission and taxpayers. See son, J., held that: (1) denial of patient's
Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-30-1 to -5 (Supp. motion for continuance was not an abuse of
1985) (currently §§ 59-1-501 to -505 (1987 discretion; (2) trial court's refusal to allow
&• Supp. 1991)). The Commission cannot patient to designate new witnesses did not
base a finding of "intentional disregard of constitute an abuse of discretion; and (3)
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patient's dilatory conduct justified dismissal of her case with prejudice.
Affirmed.
Orme, J., concurred in part and concurred in result in part, and filed opinion.
1. Appeal and Error «^966(1)
Pretrial Procedure «=»713
Trial court has substantial discretion in
deciding whether to grant continuances and
will not be reversed on appeal unless it has
abused that discretion by acting unreasonably.
2. Pretrial Procedure «=726
Trial court's refusal to grant patient a
continuance in dental malpractice action
was not abuse of discretion, where court
had already granted one continuance and
second request was solely due to patient's
own failure to retain and designate new
expert witness in timely manner.
3. Appeal and Error «=>97<K2)
Appellate court will not reverse trial
court's determination on admissibility of
evidence absent abuse of discretion impacting party's substantial rights; it is not
abuse of discretion for trial court to refuse
to admit evidence which is not timely provided to opposing party, contrary to court's
instruction.
4. Pretrial Procedure «=>3
Patient's untimely designation of new
expert and fact witnesses in dental malpractice action violated trial court's orders
and therefore, trial court did not abuse its
discretion in granting dentist's motion in
limine to preclude patient from calling
these new witnesses.
5. Pretrial Procedure «=*46
Dismissal of dental malpractice case
with prejudice was justified by patient's
dilatory conduct and failure to name witnesses until a few days prior to trial.

Douglas M. Durbano (argued) and Walter T. Merrill, Ogden, for plaintiff and appellant.

David G. Williams (argued) and Terence
L. Rooney, Snow, Christensen & Martineau, Salt Lake City, for defendant and
appellee.
Before GARFF, ORME and RUSSON,
JJ.
OPINION
RUSSON, Judge:
Gina M. Hill appeals from the district
court's order dismissing her case with prejudice. We affirm.
FACTS
In March 1990, Gina M. Hill filed a complaint against Dr. Carl Dickerson, alleging
dental malpractice arising from treatment
she received from February through April
1986.
The matter was originally set for trial on
April 10, 1991. Two days before trial, Hill
moved for a continuance of the trial on the
ground that her expert witness, her new
treating dentist, had declined to testify.
Hill, acknowledging the need for expert
testimony in order to establish her prima
facie case, represented at that time that
she had two other possible expert witnesses and would soon decide who would be
called to testify.
On April 9, 1991, the district court granted Hill's motion and ordered the parties to
exchange new expert witness lists, identifying their expert witnesses, by April 19,
1991. There was no provision in the district court's order for additional time to
identify new fact witnesses. The district
court further ordered that all discovery be
completed twenty days before the new trial
date of August 26, 1991.
On April 19, 1991, Dickerson served his
expert list in accordance with the district
court's order. On April 23, Hill's attorney
contacted Dickerson's attorney and requested that Hill be allowed to defer retaining and designating her expert witness
while settlement was being explored.
Dickerson's attorney agreed.
Settlement efforts continued until June
28, 1991, at which time a mediation confer

ence was scheduled. However, Hill refused to participate in that conference. After June 28, no further efforts at settlement were pursued.
On August 19, 1991, Hill sent a new
witness list to Dickerson, naming a new
expert witness and six additional fact witnesses, never previously identified. In response, Dickerson filed a motion in limine
to preclude Hill from calling these new
witnesses. At a hearing on August 26,
Hill's attorney again admitted that expert
testimony would be required in order for
Hill to establish her prima facie case, stating that "for us to be precluded from having an expert ... defeats our entire case."
The district court granted Dickerson's
motion on the basis that Hill's list was
untimely and in violation of the court's
April order. Moreover, the court found
that Dickerson would be "seriously prejudiced" if the witnesses were allowed to
testify. Hill orally moved for another continuance, which was denied. The district
court then dismissed Hill's case with prejudice.

trary, the fact that the district court had
already granted Hill one continuance in
April weighs heavily in favor of the court's
decision. Moreover, Hill's second request
for a continuance was solely due to her
own failure to retain and designate a new
expert witness in a timely manner. Under
such circumstances, we find no abuse in
the district court's denial of Hill's oral motion in August See id. at 926.
II. MOTION IN LIMINE
[31 We will not reverse a trial court's
determination on the admissibility of evidence absent an abuse of discretion impacting a party's substantial rights. Hardy v.
Hardy, 776 P.2d 917, 924 (Utah App.1989).
It is not an abuse of discretion for a trial
court to refuse to admit "evidence which is
not timely provided to the opposing party
contrary to the court's instruction." Id. at
925.

(2) In the case at bar, Hill has failed to
demonstrate that the district court's action
in denying her oral motion for a continuance in August 1991 was an unreasonable
action by the district court meriting reversal as an abuse of discretion. To the con-

141 In the present case, Hill's action in
naming a new expert witness and six additional fact witnesses on August 19, 1991,
was clearly contrary to the district court's
instruction. First, Hill's action violated the
court's April 9, 1991, order directing the
parties to identify their expert witnesses by
April 19, 1991. Secondly, Hill attempted to
name several additional fact witnesses, despite the fact that the court's April order
contained no provision for additional time
to identify new fact witnesses. Thirdly,
Hill's action also was inconsistent with the
district court's order that all discovery be
completed on August 6, 1991, twenty days
before the new trial date. Lastly, the court
found that to allow the newly named witnesses to testify would "seriously prejudice" Dickerson, a fact which has not been
challenged by Hill on appeal. Thus, since
Hill's untimely designation of her new expert witness violated the district court's
instruction, the court's action in granting
Dickerson'8 motion in limine clearly did not
constitute an abuse of discretion. See id.1

I- Nor docs it matter that the parties agreed
between themselves to allow Hill further time to
designate her new expert witness. First, a court
has the right to control its own calendar. See

Charlie Brown Constr. v. Leisure Sports, Inc.,
740 P.2d 1368 (Utah App.) (A trial court is not
bound by a mere agreement between the parties
which has not been incorporated in an order

Hill appeals, claiming that the district
court erred in: (1) denying her oral motion
for a continuance, (2) granting Dickerson's
motion in limine, and (3) dismissing her
case with prejudice.
I. MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE
111 The trial court has substantial discretion in deciding whether to grant continuances, Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d
1375, 1377 (Utah 1988), and will not be
reversed on appeal unless it has abused
that discretion by acting unreasonably.
Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917, 925-26
(Utah App.1989).
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III. DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE
15] Although dismissal with prejudice is
a harsh penalty, there are numerous cases
in which the Utah appellate courts have
held that a party's dilatory conduct justified such action. In Max/ield v. Fishier,
538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal with prejudice based on the plaintiff's "inexcusable neglect in failing to prepare and prosecute her claim with reasonable diligence." Id. at 1324-25. Similarly,
in Charlie Brown Constr. v. Leisure
Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah App.),
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987), we
held that, while a trial court must afford a
plaintiff "an opportunity to be heard and to
do justice," id. at 1371 (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen
Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah
1975)), it was not error for the trial court to
dismiss the plaintiffs' case with prejudice
due to their abuse of that opportunity
through dilatory conduct. Id. Accordingly, we find that Hill had ample opportunity
to litigate her case here, but abused such
opportunity, and thus we affirm the district
court's dismissal of her case with prejudice.

find opposing witnesses to respond to the
new testimony, but also encourages parties
to do so as a trial strategy. Accordingly,
we affirm the district court's order dismissing Hill's case with prejudice.
GARFF, J., concurs.
ORME, Judge (concurring in part and
concurring in the result in part):
I concur in parts I and III of the court's
opinion. Because I have some trepidation
about the majority's refusal to even consider, as a fact in mitigation, counsel's informal stipulation to extend plaintiffs time
for supplementing her witness list, I concur
only in the result of part II.
While the trial court may surely be concerned for its calendar and may impose
reasonable deadlines to insure the calendar
and its business are not disrupted, counsel
ought to have some flexibility to resolve
minor matters between themselves. Indeed, limited judicial resources are preserved by not requiring counsel to bother
the court for approval every time they per
ceive some need to massage the preliminary details of a scheduling order.

CONCLUSION
The purpose of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is to effect total fairness for all
parties in a suit. To allow one party to
have continuance after continuance to the
prejudice of the other party would be patently unfair. This is especially true when
such continuances are being granted for
the plaintiff who triggers the time constraints of litigation by bringing the suit in
the first place. It is equally unfair to allow
a party to name new witnesses several
days before trial. Allowing a party to do
so at the last minute not only prejudices
the other party by foreclosing adequate
opportunity to depose said witnesses and

In this case, with trial still four months
off, no risk of disruption was posed to the
court's basic schedule by permitting plaintiff to defer supplementing her witness list
while settlement discussions progressed, at
least for some reasonable time. To require
counsel to reduce their understanding to
writing and submit it to the court for an
order of approval would not only require
judge time to be expended on a pro forma
matter, but also would require some part
of counsel's time to be diverted from the
salutary business of settlement discussions. But had such a stipulation been
prepared and submitted, I have no doubt
the court would have signed off on it, at
least for a specific period, reasonable in

where that agreement "attempts to wrest from
the court control of its own calendar." Id. at
1371 (citations omitted).), cert, denied, 765 P.2d
1277 (Utah 1987). Moreover, the agreement in
the case at bar was not made until April 26,
1991, several days after the deadline set by the
district court for the designation of experts had
already passed. Lastly, to rule otherwise would

encourage parties to adopt a trial strategy of
persuading their opponents to allow postponement of designation of expert witness while
settlement is being pursued, only to designate
an expert a few days before trial, at which time
the opponent would have no time to depose the
said expert or to find witnesses to oppose the
new testimony.

HILL v. DICKERSON
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duration, that would not jeopardize the discovery cut-off date.
I would prefer that the informal extension in this case not be dismissed out of
hand. Rather, I would prefer to premise
our decision at least partly on this basis:
When settlement efforts terminated definitively on June 28, the extension terminated
as well by its terms. It became incumbent
on plaintiffs counsel immediately to designate his new expert. This he failed to do.
Instead, nearly two months went by before

he finally got around to submitting the new
expert's name—a scant week prior to trial
and after the discovery cut-off. Yes, this
violated the terms of the scheduling order.
Just as important in my view, it also violated the terms of counsel's stipulation.
SYSTIM>
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Creditor appealed The Supreme Court,
Stewart, J , held that the District Court did
not err by allowing debtors' expert witness
to testify concerning fair market value of
subject property
Affirmed
Zimmerman, J , concurred in result and
filed opinion

1 Pretrial Procedure <*=»713
Trial courts have substantia] discretion
in deciding whether to grant continuances
Rules Civ Proc, Rule 40(b)
2 Pretrial Procedure «=»45
Debtors' expert witness could testify
concerning fair market value of subject
property, in deficiency judgment action
brought after nonjudicial trust deed sale of
undeveloped real property, even though
debtors did not inform creditor that witness
would testify until five days before trial
and even though creditor did not receive
witness' report until one day before trial,
witness was made available to creditor ei
ther for informal interview or for deposi
taon, and creditor was not prejudicially un
prepared to conduct adequate cross-exami
nation in that only issue in action was value
of subject property U C A 1953, 57-1-32

Scott W Cameron, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and appellant
H Hal Visick, Provo, for defendants and
appellees
STEWART, Justice
The plaintiff, Cape Trust, appeals a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of
the defendants, J Paul and Loma Jewkes,
m an action for a deficiency judgment pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 57-1-82 (1986),
following a nonjudicial trust deed sale of
undeveloped real property
1. Section 57-1-32 requires that a complaint
seeking a deficiency judgment must state the
amount of the indebtedness, the amount for

The defendants owed $264,000 on a loan
made by the plaintiff The plaintiff com
menced this action seeking a deficiency
judgment for $109,000, which was owed
after a nonjudicial sale of 38 78 acres of
undeveloped property which secured the
loan The plaintiff purchased the property
at the trustee's sale for $100,000 The
complaint alleged that, according to Cape
Trust's appraisal, the market value of the
property was $155,000 or $4,000 per acre'
Subsequent to filing the complaint, the
plaintiff made various discovery requests
in September and November, 1983, and in
February, 1984 The defendants answered
the September and November requests,
they did not answer the February, 1984
request
At a January 13, 1984 pretrial conference, the court set the case for trial on
March 13, 1984, and ruled that discovery
could continue up to ten days before trial
The pretrial order stated that neither unfin
ished discovery nor failure to discover
would be grounds for continuance of the
trial date
On March 8, 1984, five days before trial,
the defendants informed the plaintiff that
they intended to call as an expert witness
Mr Gerald Higgs, an appraiser who would
testify concerning the fair market value of
the property, which he had determined to
be approximately $685,000, or $17,700 per
acre The defendants' counsel offered to
make this witness available to the plain
tiff 8 counsel despite the expiration of the
discovery period
The day before trial, the defendants gave
the plaintiff a copy of the appraiser's report, and the plaintiff thereafter asked the
defendants for a continuance Although
both the plaintiffs and the defendants'
counsel agreed to a continuance, the trial
judge refused to grant one Just before
trial the plaintiff renewed the motion for a
continuance and, in the alternative, moved
to preclude the testimony of Gerald Higgs,
which the property was sold and the fair mar
ket value of the property on the date of the sale

CHRISTENSON v. JEWKES
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pursuant to the sanction provisions of Rule
37(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure The
court denied the plaintiffs motion to continue and later, dunng the trial, denied the
motion to strike
At trial, the plaintiff presented the testimony of its expert appraiser, who appraised the value of the land at approximately $4,000 per acre, or $155,000 total
The defendants' expert, Mr Higgs, after
adjusting for the time interval between the
date of foreclosure and the date of the
appraisal, estimated the fair market value
of the land to be approximately $622,775,
or $16,070 per acre Paul Jewkes, one of
the defendants, also an expert appraiser,
testified that the value of the property was
approximately $16,500 per acre, or $639,375
total
The jury was asked to return a special
verdict fixing the fan* market value of the
property on the date of the foreclosure
sale The jury found the value to be $9,600
per acre, or $372,288 total Because the
value of the property was found to be in
excess of the amount of the debt owed, the
court entered judgment in favor of the
defendants
After the trial, the plaintiff brought a
timely motion for a new trial based on Rule
69(a)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, claiming that it was surprised by the
defendants' expert witness, Higgs, who
had not been identified in the defendants'
answers to the pretrial discovery requests
The motion for a new trial was denied, and
this appeal followed
On appeal, Cape Trust contends that the
trial court abused its discretion by denying
the continuances which were requested the
day before and the day of trial Cape
Trust also contends that the trial court
erred in failing to grant a motion for a new
trial due to the surprise caused by late
notification that Gerald Higgs would testi2. Cape Trust does not contend that the defend
ants' counsel acted in bad faith The third set
of interrogatories submitted by Cape Trust requested, among other things, the identity of
every witness the defendants intended to call

fy Because both of these contentio
volve the same issue, 1 e, the propr*
the trial court's allowing Higgs to U
we shall discuss them together
[1] Trial courts have substantial c1
tion in deciding whether to grant c
uances Utah RCivP Rule 40(b)
also State v Humpherys, 707 P2<
(Utah 1985), Griffiths v Hammon
P 2d 1375 (Utah 1977), Sharp v Gtan
ts, 63 Utah 249, 225 P 337 (1924) Su
ly, both the granting of, and the ref
to grant, a new trial is a matter left t
discretion of the trial judge, and that
sion will be reversed only if the judg
abused that discretion by acting unre
ably Batty v Mitchell, 575 P2d
1043 (Utah 1978), Smith v Shreeve
P 2d 1261 (Utah 1976), Page v Utah I
Fiie tm Co, 15 Utah 2d 257, 391 P %
(1964) Thorley v Kolob Fish & C
Club, 13 Utah 2d 294, 373 P 2d 574 (1
[2] Cape Trust contends that it
prejudiced by Higgs' testimony The
was concerned with only one issue at
the fair market value of the land
Trust asserts that since it did not kno
the defendants' expert until five dayi
fore trial and did not receive his n
until one day before trial, it did not
adequate time to evaluate comparable i
which were used as the basis for th<
pert's testimony concerning the valu
the land Cape Trust further claims
because it had inadequate time to prej
it was unable to conduct an adequate c
examination of the defendants' expert
ness*
The argument is unconvincing
though Cape Trust did not know
Higgs would testify until after the tim<
discovery closed, the expert was u
available to the plaintiff either for an u
mal interview or for a deposition
The record indicates that the defendants' <
sel provided such information to the plaii
counsel as soon as it was determined that I
would be a witness for the defendants.
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plaintiff did not take advantage of either
option.
Further, since the only issue in the case
was the value of the land and the plaintiff
had to prepare and present evidence on
that issue anyway, the plaintiff surely was
not prejudicially unprepared to conduct an
adequate cross-examination. In fact, the
record reveals that Cape Trust conducted a
very thorough examination of Mr. Higgs.
He was questioned closely concerning both
his written report and the properties listed
as comparable sales in the report. Furthermore, Cape Trust recalled its own expert appraiser as a rebuttal witness. That
appraiser testified concerning the properties listed in the Higgs appraisal. Cape
Trust's appraiser was familiar with at least
five of the comparable sales listed in the
Higgs appraisal. In short, the prejudice
claimed by Cape Trust is simply not validated by an examination of the record.
Finally, one additional factor tends to
support the conclusion that Cape Trust was
not prejudiced by the introduction of
Higgs' testimony. The jury found the value of the land to be $9,600 per acre. Undisputed testimony was given that the
property in question had sold for $9,000 per
acre in 1977, some six years before the
valuation at issue in this case. The jury
therefore had a figure for the value of the
land which was independent of the appraisers' reports and could well have been a
basis for the verdict In short, Cape Trust
has demonstrated no error and no prejudice.
AFFIRMED.
HALL, CJ„ HOWE, Associate CJ.,
and DURHAM, J., concur.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (concurring in
the result):
I agree that the decision below should be
affirmed. However, I join the result
reached by the majority only because any
error committed by the trial court in unreasonably refusing either to grant a continuance or to exclude the evidence made

MISKIN v. CARTER

known to Christenson immediately before
trial in violation of the court's orders has
not been shown to have sufficiently undermined the outcome so as to lead me to
believe that the error was harmful under
the harmless error test of Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 61 and Utah Rule of Evidence 103(a). See Ashton v. Ashton, 733
P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987); Redevelopment
Agency of Roy v. Jones, 743 P.2d 1233,
1235 (Utah Ct. App.1987); see also State v.
Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 91&-20 (Utah 1987).
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1. Automobiles *=»245(1)
Mere presence of legal minimum for
establishing driving while intoxicated, combined with nothing more than negligent
conduct, was insufficient to put issue of
punitive damages in a personal injury suit
arising from motor vehicle accident to the
jury; driver had consumed three or four
drinks more than four hours prior to driving and had entered intersection after light
had changed.
2. Automobiles «=»249
Under some circumstances, manner in
which a vehicle is operated, when considered in light of driver's degree of intoxication and driver's past behavior patterns,
may warrant punitive damages.

G. Steven Sullivan, Robert J. DeBry, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant
Sandra MISKIN, Plaintiff
and Appellant,

Roger Christensen, Roger Fairbanks,
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellee.

v.
Marianne CARTER, Defendant
and Appellee.
No. 20587.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 25, 1988.

Following automobile accident, injured
party brought suit seeking damages and
punitive damages. The District Court,
Third District, Salt Lake County, James S.
Sawaya, J., granted defendant partial summary judgment on punitive damages issue.
On appeal, the Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that: (1) mere presence of
legal minimum for establishing drunk driving combined with nothing more than negligent conduct was insufficient to warrant
imposition of punitive damages, and (2) under some circumstances punitive damages
could be warranted by drunk driving.
Affirmed.

Utah 13
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ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Plaintiff Sandra Miskin appeals from a
grant of partial summary judgment dismissing her claim for punitive damages.
That claim was based on an accident arising from defendant Marianne Carter's operation of a motor vehicle while legally
intoxicated. We affirm.
The record regarding Carter's conduct
was fully developed below through discovery. We consider those facts in the
light most favorable to Miskin. See, e.g.,
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah
1983). Carter had consumed three or four
alcoholic drinks on the day in question.
After drinking, Carter had a friend drive
her car back to their place of employment,
and then Carter waited four hours before
driving the car herself. When she did
drive, she entered an intersection immediately after the light had turned red and
collided with Miskin's car. Miskin sued,
claiming that Carter had injured her by
driving her car negligently and recklessly

while intoxicated. Miskin sought gem
and punitive damages.
Carter admitted her negligence and
cepted liability for Miskin's general di
ages but moved for partial summary ju<
ment on the issue of punitive damag
The trial court granted the motion, ruli
that, as a matter of law, bare evidence
legal intoxication combined with sim]
negligence in the operation of a motor '
hide, without more, is insufficient to si
port a claim for punitive damages.
The Utah cases that have attempted
define the legal standard for awarding f
nitive damages in tort cases appear to
somewhat in conflict, as noted recently 1
the Utah Court of Appeals in Biswell
Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 83-84 (Utah CtAp
1987). In false imprisonment cases, v
have applied a "malice in fact" or "actu
malice" standard. See McFarland
Skaggs Companies, 678 P.2d 298, 3(
(Utah 1984). In other cases, we have a
plied the "implied malice" or "malice i
law" standard, often characterized as reel
less disregard for the rights of anothe
See, e.g., Branch v. Western Petroleun
Inc., 667 P.2d 267, 277-78 (Utah 1982
Still other cases state that either the "acti
al malice" or the "implied malice" standar
applies in determining the propriety of
punitive damages award. See, e.g., Atkir<
Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. t
Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 337 (Utah 1985
We note that these conflicts in the states
standards may be more apparent than real
at least when the legal and factual context
in which the standards have been enunciat
ed are taken into account. Be that as i
may, we have no occasion to address thes<
precedents because, whatever may be th<
case with respect to the standards appro
priate for other causes of action, today w<
have clarified the standard for imposing
punitive damages in drunken driving cases,
In Johnson v. Rogers, — P.2d
, No.
20622, slip op. (Utah August 25, 1988), wc
settled on the "knowing and reckless disregard for the rights of others" standard.
The question is whether that standard is
satisfied here.
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ing and insubstantial that a reasonable person could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt" State v.
Tanner, 675 P 2d 539, 550 (Utah 1983).
Clearly the State's evidence supports the
trial court's finding. Therefore, we affirm
defendant's conviction.
GREENWOOD and GARFF, JJ.,
concur.

NIMMt SVSTEM>

CHARLIE BROWN CONSTRUCTION
CO., INC., a Nevada Corporation, Charlie Brown and Carina Brown, Plaintiffs
and Appellants,
v.
LEISURE SPORTS INCORPORATED, a
Nevada Corporation, West Village Unit
No. One, Mt. Holly Recreation Community, Conrad H. Koning, and Amy J.
Koning, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 860119-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Aug. 17, 1987.
Plaintiffs appealed an order of the District Court, Beaver County, J. Harlan
Burns, J., denying their motion to set aside
dismissal of their complaint. The Court of
Appeals, Bench, J., held that: (1) rule governing dismissal for failure to prosecute
merely permits, and does not require, motion by defendant for dismissal; (2) parties'
prior stipulation to postpone any pretrial
conference which was communicated to and
filed with court did not prevent trial court
from dismissing suit for failure to prosecute; regardless of whether trial court never knew of, ignored, or simply forgot about
stipulation, plaintiffs themselves failed to
comply with intent of stipulation by failing
to move for order compelling discovery after additional 30-day period to respond to

interrogatories had expired and no response had been received; and (3) trial
court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing suit with prejudice on the merits
for failure to prosecute; trial court provided plaintiffs an opportunity to be heard and
to do justice, and plaintiffs nevertheless
abused their opportunity through dilatory
conduct
Affirmed.
1. Pretrial Procedure «=»674
Rule governing dismissal for failure to
prosecute merely permits, and does not require, motion by defendant for dismissal.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 41(b).
2. Stipulations «=»3
Trial court is not necessarily bound by
mere stipulation between parties which has
not been incorporated in an order, where
stipulation attempts to wrest from the
court control of its own calendar.
3. Stipulations «=>3
Parties' prior stipulation to postpone
any pretrial conference which was communicated to and filed with court did not prevent trial court from dismissing suit for
failure to prosecute; regardless of whether
trial court never knew of, ignored, or simply forgot about stipulation, plaintiffs
themselves failed to comply with intent of
stipulation by failing to move for order
compelling discovery after additional 30day period to respond to interrogatories
had expired and no response had been received. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 37.
4. Pretrial Procedure «=>596
Generally, law office delays or failures
are unacceptable excuses for failure to
prosecute.
5. Pretrial Procedure *»587, 690
Trial court did not abuse its discretion
by dismissing suit with prejudice on the
merits for failure to prosecute; trial court
provided plaintiffs an opportunity to be
heard and to do justice, and plaintiffs
nevertheless abused their opportunity
through dilatory conduct. Rules Civ.Proc.,
Rule 41(b).
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Jackson Howard, Leslie W. Slaugh, Provo, for appellants.
Russell J. Gallian, Gallian, Drake &
Westfall, St. George, for respondents.
Before JACKSON, BENCH and
ORME, JJ.
OPINION
BENCH, Judge:
Plaintiffs appeal an order of the district
court denying their motion to set aside the
dismissal of their complaint. We affirm.
Plaintiffs are the purchasers and owners
of certain lots at Mount Holly Ski Resort.
Defendants are the developers of the area.
On June 15, 1981, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants to compel completion of certain road improvements. At defendants' request, plaintiffs posted a nonresident cost bond pursuant to Utah
R.Civ.P. 12(j). Defendants then filed their
answer on July 6, 1981.
Ten and one-half months later, on May
27, 1982, plaintiffs filed a motion to amend
their complaint and a notice to take defendants Conrad and Amy Koning's depositions.
At defendants' request, the depositions
were postponed to July 9, 1982. On June
14, a hearing was held on plaintiffs' motion
to amend their complaint. Plaintiffs failed
to appear and the motion was denied subject to renewal at a later date. On June 21,
1982, John B. Maycock filed an appearance
as defendants' co-counsel. Subsequently,
defendants' original counsel, Scott J. Thorley, withdrew.
On July 9 and 16, 1982, defendants filed
motions for protective orders requesting
their depositions not be taken. Defendants
based their motions on protective orders
issued in concurrent federal litigation. The
court never ruled on the motions, nor did
plaintiffs pursue their requested depositions. Plaintiffs filed interrogatories with
the court on April 4, 1983, nine months
after defendants' motions for protective orders. Plaintiffs' counsel mistakenly mailed
a set of the interrogatories to Thorley,
defendants' former counsel, who never forwarded the interrogatories to Maycock.

On December 5, 19<°° after eight more
months of inactivity, \ • court sua sponte
filed an order to show cause why the case
should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. The court ordered both parties to
appear on March 19, 1984. Failure to appear "[would] be considered as acquiescence to entry of an order of dismissal
and the judgment [would] be entered by
the Court without further notice to the
parties." The court also filed a notice for a
pre-trial hearing, also set for March 19,
1984. Plaintiffs realized the error with the
interrogatories and entered into a stipulation with defendants allowing defendants
thirty more days to respond. The stipulation also gratuitously stated, "this matter
should be stricken from the Court's PreTrial Calendar until the parties have completed their discovery or until either party
requests a Pre-Trial Conference."
The morning of March 19, plaintiffs'
counsel telephoned the trial court judge
and informed him of the stipulation. The
trial court excused the parties' absence and
in a second order to show cause continued
the pre-trial to April 16, 1984. A transmittal letter, which referred to the telephone
conversation and the stipulation, was filed
on March 22. On April 16, 1984, the court
again continued the matter for sixty days.
A signed stipulation was filed on April 19,
1984. On April 30, 1984, the trial court sua
sponte mailed notices to the parties setting
trial for June 18, 1984. Plaintiffs contacted the trial court executive and explained
the stipulation. The trial court executive,
rather than vacating the date, sent revised
notices changing the trial setting to a pretrial hearing.
On June 15, 1984, plaintiffs' counsel personally spoke to the trial court judge in S t
George. Counsel explained the stipulation
and informed the judge a settlement was
likely. The court allegedly excused the
parties from appearing at the June 18 hearing. However, when the matter was called
on June 18 and neither party was present,
the judge ordered the case dismissed. In a
minute entry, the court stated:
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This matter was called on hearing for a
Pre-Trial Conference. No one appeared
on behalf of either party. This matter
had been set several times for pre-trial
and no one had ever appeared. The
Court ordered the matter dismissed with
prejudice and on the merits. The minute
entry will serve as the Order of Dismissal. A copy is *to be mailed to the respective parties.
The court clerk mailed copies of the unsigned minute entry to both parties on June
28.
Due to error, allegedly on the part of
plaintiffs' counsel's secretary, the minute
entry did not come to plaintiffs' counsel's
attention until seven months later in January, 1985.1 When plaintiffs' counsel became aware of the minute entry, he attempted to consult with the trial court and
defendants. Unable to do so, he filed a
motion on February 25 to set aside the
dismissal. At a hearing on March 18, 1985,
the court reviewed the entire file and considered arguments of counsel.2 The court,
noting plaintiffs' failure diligently to prosecute their lawsuit, affirmed the dismissal
and entered orders accordingly.
[1] On appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs' motion
to set aside the dismissal. Plaintiffs argue
under Utah R.Civ.P. 41(b) the court has no
authority to dismiss for failure to prosecute absent a motion by defendants. The
rule states, "For failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute or comply with these rules or
any order of court, a defendant may move
for dismissal of an action or of any claim
against him." The language in Rule 41(b)
merely permits, not requires, a motion by
defendant. The Utah Supreme Court, in
Brasher Motor and Finance Co. v.
Broum, 23 Utah 2d 247, 461 P.2d 464, 46465 (1969), states, "In dismissing an action
for want of prosecution, the court may
proceed under [Rule 41(b) ], or it may, of its
own motion, take action to that end." See
1. During this seven month period, Maycock
filed a notice of withdrawal and defendants
Konings, in reliance on the minute entry, sold
their shares in co-defendant Leisure Sports, Inc.

also Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 765, 768
(Utah 1980). Under the comparable federal
rule, the United States Supreme Court similarly held:
Neither the permissive language of the
Rule—which merely authorizes a motion
by the defendant—nor its policy requires
us to conclude that it was the purpose of
the Rule to abrogate the power of courts,
acting on their own initiative, to clear
their calendars of cases that have remained dormant because of the inaction
or dilatoriness of the parties seeking relief. The authority of a court to dismiss
sua sponte for lack of prosecution has
generally been considered an "inherent
power," governed not by rule or statute
but by the control necessarily vested in
courts to manage their own affairs so as
to achieve the orderly and expeditious
disposition of cases.
Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 63031, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1388-89, 8 L.Ed.2d 734
(1962).
As stated in Lake Meredith Reservoir
Co. v. Amity Mutual Irrigation Co., 698
P.2d 1340, 1344 (Colo.1985), "The burden is
upon the plaintiff to prosecute a case in
due course without unusual or unreasonable delay." Plaintiffs are required "to
prosecute their claims with due diligence,
or accept the penalty of dismissal." Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Utah
1975). Dismissal for failure to prosecute is
a decision within the broad discretion of the
trial court. This Court will not interfere
with that decision unless it clearly appears
that the court has abused its discretion and
that there is a likelihood an injustice has
been wrought. Department of Soc. Serv.
v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah
1980).
At the March 18 hearing on plaintiffs'
motion to set aside the dismissal, the court
reviewed the entire file. The court reviewed plaintiffs' ten and one-half months
delay after defendants filed their answer
2. Defendants opposed plaintiffs' motion, arguing their counsel never had been authorized to
enter into any stipulation to delay the action.
The claim is of questionable relevance and is
not a factor in our decision.
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and plaintiffs' failure to attend the hearing
on their motion to amend their complaint.
The court reviewed plaintiffs' failure to
pursue a ruling on defendants' motion for
protective orders against the requested
depositions. The court reviewed another
ten month delay before plaintiffs pursued
another discovery device, namely the interrogatories. The court also reviewed eight
months more of delay before plaintiffs discovered defendants did not have the interrogatories. Finally, and as noted by the
court in its order denying plaintiffs' motion
to set aside the dismissal, the court reviewed yet another eight months delay by
plaintiffs from the time notification of the
minute entry was received until they filed a
motion to set aside the dismissal.
[2] Plaintiffs argue the court erred in
dismissing their action in light of the
court's alleged excusal of both parties' appearance at the June 18 hearing. Plaintiffs
contend the trial court was bound by the
parties' prior stipulation to postpone any
pre-trial conference which was communicated to and filed with the court. However, a trial court is not necessarily bound
by a mere stipulation between parties
which has not been incorporated in an order where the stipulation attempts to wrest
from the court control of its own calendar.
See Lake Meredith, 698 P.2d at 1346.
[3] Regardless of whether the trial
court never knew of, ignored, or simply
forgot about the stipulation, plaintiffs
themselves failed to comply with the intent
of the stipulation. The primary purpose of
the stipulation was to provide defendants
an additional thirty days to respond to the
interrogatories. When the thirty day period expired and no response had been received, plaintiffs did not move under Utah
R.Civ.P, 37 for an order compelling discovery nor attempt in any way to move the
case forward.
[4] Plaintiffs do not claim the stipulation as an excuse for any of their numerous
delays. Rather, plaintiffs' counsel asserts
secretarial error as an excuse for the delay
after receipt of the minute entry. Generally, law office delays or failures are unacceptable excuses for failure to prosecute

Valente v. First Western Savini
Loan Ass'n, 528 P.2d 699, 700 (Ne
[5] Plaintiffs last argue the tria
erred in dismissing their action with
dice and on the merits. Rule 41(b)
"Unless the court in its order for dii
otherwise specifies, a dismissal und
subdivision and any dismissal not pr
for in this rule, other than a dismisi
lack of jurisdiction or for improper
or for lack of an indispensable party
ates as an adjudication upon the m
Plaintiffs cite three Utah Supreme
cases which reversed a trial court's d
sal with prejudice as an abuse of disci
Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2(i
(Utah 1977) (motion to dismiss filed i
same time as defendant's answer);
Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 I
1977) (delay due to settlement nej
tions); Crystal Lime & Cement C
Robbins, 8 Utah 2d 389, 335 P.2d 624 (
(failure to consider counterclaims). 1
three cases are readily distinguish
The facts of this case are much clos<
those of Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d
(Utah 1975). In Maxfield, the Utah
preme Court affirmed a trial court's dig
sal with prejudice against the plaintifl
"inexcusable neglect in failing to pre
and prosecute her claim with reason
diligence." Id. at 1324-25. In the ins
case, the trial court provided plaintiffs
opportunity to be heard and to do justi
Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paui
Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876,
(Utah 1975).
Plaintiffs
neverthe
abused their opportunity through dilat
conduct.
We therefore find no abuse of discret
and affirm the trial court's order deny
plaintiffs' motion to set aside the dismisi
Costs to defendants.
ORME and JACKSON, JJ., concur.
4M R SYSTtM>
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MAXFIELD v FISHLER
r i t e IIR 538 P 2d 1323

raised about the personal property being
there until after controversy over the forfeiture developed
We are not persuaded
that we should disagree with the view taken by the trial court that the plaintiff did
not, and could not, make a showing that
this storage was of sufficient substance
and materiality to justify its non-performance
[5,6] Plaintiff's second contention is
that on or about December 8, 1973, the
Holts had orally agreed to a modification
of the contract to allow for reduced payments until the personal property was re
moved
It says that the payment of $500
on December 10th and the $1,000 paid on
December 16th were made in accordance
with that oral agreement
In support of
that claim plaintiff points to the fact that
on the latter check there are the words, "as
per agreement of 1 2 - 8 - 7 3 " This, plaintiff
argues, is a sufficient memorandum in
writing to modify the original contract and
satisfy the statute of frauds It is elementary that when a contract is required to be
in writing, the same requirement applies
with equal force to any alteration or modification thereof 4 More importantly here,
any such modifying agreement must be
sufficiently certain and unequivocal in its
terms that the parties will understand what
it is and what is to be done under i t 5
Neither the check, nor the quoted notation
thereon, make any such recitals and they
therefore do not meet that requirement.

taming to oral modification also apply
here The payments referred to could well
be regarded as payments on the written
contract and they do not unequivocally relate to any oral contract
[8-10] Plaintiff's final argument is
that it tendered the payments due under
the contract on four separate occasions
Its evidence relates to two occasions after
the forfeiture had occurred. These are
thus not material to the issues involved
here With respect to the other two, these
observations are pertinent
A tender requires that there be a bona fide, unconditional, offer of payment of the amount of
money due, coupled with an actual produc
tion of the money or its equivalent 8
What occurred was that plaintiff's president discussed with the defendants the
prospect that payment would be made un
cer certain conditions
But there was no
actual tender of the amounts due under the
contract within the foregoing definition,
nor even a tender of such amounts due,
less a reasonable and specific set-off for
storage of the defendants property on the
premises

[7] Plaintiff also claims, in the alternative, that the oral agreement is removed
from the statute of frauds due to the equitable principle of part performance, which
is part of our law by statute, 6 and
decision 7 The observations just made per-

[11] The immutable proposition faced
by the plaintiff in this case is this that
unless there is some showing of legal ex
cuse or justification for failure to perform
the obligations of a contract, it must be en
forced according to its terms • The facts
of controlling significance are that when
it took over the contract on July 18, 1973,
it knew that it was assuming the duty to
pay 13 days later, on August 1, $7,000
principal, plus $1,600 interest, a total of
$8,600, which obligation it did not meet It
did make the payments listed above, aggre
gating $7,500 paid by December 16, 1973,

4

7

5

6

See Sec 25-5-1, 3, Utah Code Ann 1053,
and Coombs v Ouzouman, 24 Utah 2d 39, 4t>5
P2d 356 (1970) Combined Metals v Bas
tian, 71 Utah 535, 2<>7 P 1020 (1928)
See Bough v Logan City, 27 Utah 2d 291,
495 P2d 814 (1972) Birdzell v Utah Oil
Refining Co, 121 Utah 412, 242 P2d 578
(1952)
Sec 25-5-8, Utah Code Ann 1953

Holmgren Brothers, Inc v Ballard, Utah
534 P2d 611 (1975), and authorities tited
therein
8 74 Am Jur 2d p 545 , as to tender by check
unless the offeree objects to payment by < he< k
see Sec 70A-2-511, U C.A 1953
9 Paggi v Skhns, 54 Utah 88, 179 P 739
(1919)

thus $1,100 short of the amount past due,
and when the next annual installment of
something over $8,000, came due on hebruary 1, 1974, it failed to make that payment
This brought the defendants' notice of forfeiture, to which the plaintiff made no responsive performance, but instead attempted to justify non performance on the
grounds discussed herein.
Upon consideration of the total circumstances as shown by the depositions and
documentary evidence, we are not persuaded that the trial court was in error in concluding that plaintiff has raised no issue of
material fact which if resolved in its favor
would entitle it to prevail Therefore the
summary judgment will not be disturbed
Affirmed
spondents)

Costs

to

defendants

(re-

HENRIOD,
C
J,
and
ELLETT,
T U C K E T T and M A U G H A N , J], concur

Susan E. MAXFIELD, as guardian ad litem
for Laurie Ann Maxfleld, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Kenneth O. FISHLER, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 13955.
Supreme Court of Utah
Aug 1, 1975

Action was brought seeking to recover
damages for medical malpractice
The
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Bryant H Croft, J , dismissed the complaint for failure to prosecute, and plainhff appealed. The Supreme Court, Hard-

Utah 1323

ing, District Judge, pro tern held that dismissal for failure to prosecute did not con
stitute an abuse of discretion since plaintiff was not ready to proceed on trial date,
which was more than two years after complaint was filed, such failure was the result
of inexcusable neglect, and no justification
for a continuance was shown.
Affirmed.
Ellett, J , dissented and filed opinion
in which Maughan, J , joined
Crockett, J , disqualified himself.

1. Dismissal and Nonsuit €=>60(l)
Litigants must prosecute their claims
with due diligence, or accept the penalty of
dismissal. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
41(b)
2. Dismissal and Nonsuit @=>60(6)
Where medical malpractice action was
filed on October 18, 1972, trial date was
set for October 24, 1974, where on trial
date plaintiff's counsel moved for continuance after stating that person he had
hoped would testify was absent, and where
record showed that plaintiff or her counsel
had been dilatory in responding to efforts
of defendant to obtain discovery and had
resisted defendant's attempts to resolve the
issue by getting the case to trial, dismissal
for failure to prosecute was not an abuse
of discretion since plaintiff was not ready
to proceed on trial date, such failure was
the result of inexcusable neglect, and no
justification for continuance was shown.
Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 40(b),
41(b).

Boyd M. Fullmer of Fullmer & Harding,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
John H. Snow, Worsley, Snow & C h n s tensen, Salt Lake City, for defendant and
respondent.
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HARDING, District Judge Pro Tern.:
Plaintiff appeals from the trial court's
order dismissing her complaint with prejudice for failure to prosecute pursuant to
Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The basic question is whether or not the
trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the action.
The complaint, for medical malpractice,
was filed October 18, 1972, and process
was served on October 23, 1972. The defendant answered on November 13, 1972.
The plaintiff was a nonresident of Utah,
and defendant filed a notice requiring security for costs. The plaintiff failed to
file a bond within one month as required
by Rule 12(j), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and on December 26, 1972, the defendant moved for a dismissal. The plaintiff was ordered to file the bond by January 3, 1973. No bond whatever was filed
until January 10, 1975, at the time the notice of appeal was filed.
On January 25, 1973, the defendant took
the plaintiff's deposition. Neither party
took any further action in the case until
March 14, 1974, when defendant submitted
interrogatories and asked that the case be
set for trial. Plaintiff objected to the interrogatories and to the setting of the case
for trial on the grounds of insufficiency of
time to answer the interrogatories and that
discpvery had not been completed. The
objections were not noticed for hearing,
but a trial date was set for October 29,
1974, with a jury. Additional interrogatories were submitted by defendant on May
20, 1974, which went unanswered, and on
October 18, 1974, the defendant moved for
an order to require answers or for dismissal of the claim. The answers were filed
October 24, 1974, five days before the trial
date.
On the trial date, plaintiff, her husband,
and her counsel, and the defendant and his
counsel were present. Plaintiff's counsel
requested a conference with the court in

chambers before selecting the jurors to try
the case. At the conference plaintiff's
counsel acknowledged that he had no medical expert to testify. He stated that the
person he had hoped to have testify was
absent from the jurisdiction when he had
attempted to subpoena him four days earlier and would not return by the trial date.
No medical experts had been deposed or
even contacted for the purpose of testifying by plaintiff's counsel. Plaintiff's counsel moved for a continuance. The court
asked plaintiff's counsel to make an offer
of proof of the testimony he expected of
the medical expert.
Plaintiff's counsel
stated that one of the doctors who had
cared for the child for whom damages
were being sought had said that the defendant had done nothing wrong in caring
for the child, but claimed that the same
doctor had made contrary statements to the
plaintiff. That was the extent of the offer
of proof as far as plaintiff's claim was
concerned.
The court determined that a sufficient
showing of diligence or of justification for
a continuance had not been made and denied the motion.
Plaintiff's counsel now states that he
could have proceeded with the trial using
only the parents of the child and the defendant doctor as an adverse witness on
the question of the proper standard of care
of a medical doctor. The record does not
show that a request to so proceed was ever
made.
[1,2] No showing was made that plaintiff's counsel had made or attempted to
make any discovery of evidence to support
the action. The record showed that plaintiff or her counsel had been dilatory in responding to defendant's efforts at discovery, and had resisted his attempts to resolve the issues by getting the case to trial.
It is evident that plaintiff was not ready
to proceed at the time the trial date arrived; that such failure was the result of
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inexcusable neglect in failing to prepare
and prosecute her claim with reasonable
diligence; and that no justification for
continuance was shown as required by
Rule 40(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
If Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is to be effective in expediting and
resolving litigation, it must require litigants to prosecute their claims with due
diligence, or accept the penalty of dismissal.
The ruling of the trial court is affirmed.
Costs to respondent.
H E N R I O D , C. J., and T U C K E T T , J.,
concur.
ELLETT, Justice (dissenting):
This case was dismissed for failure to
prosecute on the very day it was to be
tried. The plaintiff moved for a continuance in order for her to obtain an expert
witness, and the defendant thereupon
moved for the dismissal of the action.
In the light of the history of this case, I
think the court might have been justified
in refusing to continue the matter, but I do
not see how the court could dismiss it for
failure to prosecute at trial unless the
plaintiff refused to produce evidence.
While it may have appeared to the trial
judge that the plaintiff was certain to lose
the case in the absence of an expert witness, I think he could not for that reason
dismiss the case. He should have ordered
the plaintiff to proceed to trial. A dismissal might have been proper at the conclusion of her evidence, but not before it was
offered.
I would reverse the judgment of dismissal and award costs to the appellant.
MAUGHAN, J., concurs in the views
expressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice EHett.
CROCKETT, J., having disqualified
himself, does not participate herein.

Dennis PRINCE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Darlene PETERSON, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 13765.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 22, 1975.

Defendant appealed a judgment of the
Fourth District Court, Utah County, J.
Robert Bullock, J., awarding plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages in libel
and slander suit. The Supreme Court,
Crockett, J., held that written and oral
statements that defendant was a "clever
crook" and was "stealing from his own
children," made in regard to plaintiff's operation of business and his efforts to sell
it, were slanderous; that award of $5,537
as compensatory damages to plaintiff who
spent approximately 25 days attempting to
overcome harm caused by slanderous remarks would not be disturbed; and that
award of $3,000 punitive damages was excessive and would be reduced to $1,000.
Affirmed as modified.
Hennod, C. J., fded a dissenting opinion in which Maughan, J., concurred.
1. Libel and Slander ®=»6(I)
The making of some general statement
about another being a crook or even using
profanity against him in a general way
may not be actionable slander; however, if
words of such character are used in a context or under circumstances as they would
reasonably be understood to come within
traditional requirements of libel or slander:
that is, to hold a person up to hatred, contempt or| ridicule, or to injure him in his
business or vocation, they are deemed actionable per se; and law presumes that
damages will be suffered therefrom.
2. Libel and Slander <S=>6(2, 4)
Written and oral statements that plaintiff was a drunk and a "clever crook" and
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Colin Edward HARDY, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Nellie Peterson HARDY, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 870348-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 20, 1989.
Former husband filed motion for modification of divorce decree, requesting custody of child. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, John A. Rokich, J., modified
divorce decree by transferring custody of
child from former wife to former husband,
and former wife appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Garff, J., held that: (1) trial court
properly received evidence pertaining not
only to former wife's changed circumstances but also as to child's best interests in
nonbifurcated hearing; (2) remand of case
was necessary for entry of appropriate
findings which clearly articulated judge's
considerations behind his finding that
change of custody was in child's best interests; (3) trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to continue trial to allow
former wife's new attorneys to prepare for
trial; and (4) substantial evidence in record
as to former wife's precarious financial circumstances, as compared with former husband's relatively prosperous situation, justified trial court's refusal to award costs to
former husband.
Affirmed in part and remanded.
1. Divorce «=»303<2)
If initial custody decree is unlitigated,
such as where custody is obtained by default divorce or parties stipulate as to custody, then trial court, on motion to modify
custody decree, may focus custody determination on child's best interests, as opposed
to custodial parent's changed circumstances.
2. Divorce «=»303(2, 5)
Trial court properly received evidence
pertaining not only to custodial parent's

changed circumstances, but also as V
child's best interests, in nonbifurcata
hearing on noncustodial parent's motion U
modify divorce decree by changing custodi
al parent for child, even though initial fc
cus in modification proceedings is normal 1;
on custodial parent's changed circumstanc
es, and child's best interests are considered
only after changed circumstances an
found; initial custody determination wa
stipulated to by parties, and thus custod;
was not based on impartial judicial exami
nation of child's best interests, and evi
dence establishing parents' substance ad
dictions was also probative for both deter
mining child's best interests and parties
respective parenting abilities.
3. Appeal and Error «=>1008.1(5)
Trial «=395<5)
Trial court's findings of fact must in
elude enough facts to disclose procesi
through which ultimate conclusion ii
reached; indicate that process is logica
and properly supported; and not be clearl]
erroneous.
4. Parent and Child *=»2(18)
Trial court should state those factors i
considered in making its determination oi
motion to change custodial parent, such ai
needs of child, ability of each parent U
meet those needs, parenting ability of cus
todial parent, and functioning of estab
lished custodial relationship.
5. Trial <*=»393(3)
Oral findings of fact and conclusion!
of law made by court when it rules fron
bench are sufficient. Rules Civ.Proc., Rul<
52(a).
6. Parent and Child «=»2(18)
Weight that trial court accords to sta
bility and continuity of existing custodia
relationship when determining whether U
change custodial parent will depend upor
duration of existing custody arrangement
child's age, nature of developing relation
ship between child and both parents, anc
how well child is thriving physically, men
tally and emotionally.
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7. Divorce «=*312.7
Remand of trial court's determination
to modify divorce decree by transferring
custody of child from former wife to former husband was necessary for entry of
appropriate findings which clearly articulated judge's considerations behind his finding that change in custody was in child's
best interests; judge orally found that
change of custody was in child's best interests, but failed to make any specific factual
findings supporting that conclusion.
8. Divorce «=»312.2, 312.5
Court of Appeals would not consider
former wife's allegation that trial court
erred in failing to provide written instructions to expert witnesses in custody hearing pursuant to Rules of Evidence, where
record indicated that alleged lack of written instructions was not objected to nor
even mentioned at time of trial, and there
was no indication in record as to what
instructions, if any, were given to expert
witnesses. Rules of Evid., Rule 706(a).
9. Appeal and Error «=970(2)
Court of Appeals will not reverse trial
court's determination on admissibility of
proffered evidence absent abuse of discretion affecting party's substantial rights.
Rules of Evid., Rule 103.
10. Pretrial Procedure «=»45
Trial court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit evidence which is
not timely provided to opposing party, contrary to court's instructions.
11. Divorce «=>85
Letter from former wife's therapist
was inadmissible in child custody modification hearing, where former wife had not
timely provided it to former husband.
12. Evidence e»535
Home study performed by former
wife's counselor at out-patient drug treatment center was inadmissible in child custody modification hearing, as counselor had
not qualified as expert.
13. Appeal and Error «=>931(6)
Where trial is to court rather than to
jury, court's rulings on evidence need not

be subjected to as critical an inquiry because, in arriving at his conclusions, judge
will include in his consideration his knowledge and judgment as to materiality, competency and effect of evidence; in such
cases, there is presumption that trial judge
has disregarded all inadmissible evidence in
reaching his decision.
14. Divorce «=>303(8)
Trial judge did not abuse his discretion
in child custody modification hearing by
reading depositions and reports that judge
did not admit into evidence; trial judge
specifically disavowed placing much reliance on them in his decision making process.
15. Divorce <S=312.6(9)
Whether trial judge erred in refusing
to admit certain depositions into evidence in
child custody modification proceeding was
immaterial, where disputed evidence, regarding former wife's cocaine addiction
and relationship with drug dealer, was
merely cumulative to other evidence, including former wife's own testimony.
16. Appeal and Error «=>966(1)
Pretrial Procedure «=>713
Granting of continuance rests in sound
discretion of trial court, and denial of continuance will not be reversed *on appeal
unless court has abused that discretion by
acting unreasonably.
17. Divorce «=*145
Trial court did not abuse its discretion
by denying continuance to former wife in
child custody modification proceeding, even
though former wife had new attorney,
where judge had already continued trial at
former wife's request on one other occasion so that new counsel could prepare
case, prosecution of case had been substantially delayed by former wife's dilatory conduct, and trial judge had previously made it
clear that time was of essence in that
child's best interests required timely resolution of dispute.
18. Divorce «=»188
In modification of divorce decrees pursuant to continuing jurisdiction of trial
court, question of ability or inability of

HARDY v. HARDY
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party to pay costs in defending matter is
factual matter which lies in discretion of
trial court. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5.
19. Divorce «=»312V4
Substantial evidence set forth in record
as to former wife's precarious financial circumstances, as compared to former husband's relatively prosperous situation, justified trial court's refusal to award costs to
former husband after divorce decree was
modified by transferring custody of child
from former wife to former husband.
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ed S. In the beginning of 1985, S. had
been a bright, outgoing, happy three-yearold who made friends easily. By the end of
1985 and during the first three months of
1986, however, she had become withdrawn,
standoffish, depressed, and exhibited other
disturbed behavior as a result of appellant's neglect.

In November 1985, respondent successfully completed a hospital alcoholism treatment program, and was alcohol-free at the
time of this action. However, he used marijuana twice in April 1986.

On April 18, 1986, at 1:00 p.m., a highway patrolman stopped appellant for speeding and driving erratically on the freeway
in Utah County. He found S. in the vehicle, unrestrained by a seatbelt. Because
appellant was in a confused, excited, incoherent state and appeared to be under the
influence of drugs, the patrolman transported the two to the Timpview Mental
Health Unit in Provo and involuntarily
committed appellant. Appellant and S.
were then transported to the University
Hospital in Salt Lake City. Appellant's
attending physician believed that she was
suffering from chronic cocaine abuse syndrome in which delusional disorders and
severe impairment might be present for
weeks or months, and that appellant was in
no condition to care for S.
University Hospital personnel informed
respondent that appellant had been admitted to the hospital and that if he was not
able to pick up S., the hospital would have
to place her in a shelter home. Respondent
agreed to take S. and to return her to
appellant's custody upon her discharge.
Instead of returning S. to appellant's custody, however, he took S. home with him that
night and subsequently moved her to his
parents' home in Saratoga, California.
On April 24, 1986, appellant discharged
herself from the hospital against medical
advice, and returned to her parents' home
in Scottsdale, Arizona. She subsequently
admitted herself to Terros, an outpatient
drug treatment center in Phoenix, Arizona,
where she completed a twenty-one day detoxification program.

In the summer of 1985, appellant substantially increased her cocaine usage and
became romantically involved with Rudy
Lema, a drug dealer. In February 1986,
appellant quit her job because of cocaine
usage. During this time, appellant neglect-

On May 8, 1986, respondent filed a motion for modification of the 1985 custody
order, requesting custody of S. On May
19, 1986, the trial court heard respondent's
motion, and, in a preliminary injunction,
ordered both parties to undergo home stud-

John B. Anderson, William A. Somppi,
Allan M. Metos, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
John F. Clark, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
Before DAVIDSON, GARFF and
ORME, JJ.
GARFF, Judge:
Defendant/appellant, Nellie Peterson
Hardy, appeals the trial court's order which
modified the divorce decree transferring
custody of the parties' minor child, S., from
her to plaintiff/respondent, Colin Edward
Hardy. We affirm in part and remand for
findings consistent with this opinion.
The parties were married in 1982 and had
one child, S. During this marriage, both
p rties engaged in drug and alcohol abuse.
They were divorced on April 8, 1985, stipulating that appellant was a fit and proper
person to have custody of S. The trial
court was unaware at that time that appellant was addicted to cocaine and that respondent was an alcoholic.

920

Utah

776 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

ies and psychological evaluations. It also
awarded temporary custody of S. to appellant so long as she resided with her parents
in Scottsdale, Arizona, and forbade either
party to abuse drugs in S.'s presence.
On September 5, 1986, appellant's counsel withdrew. Appellant subsequently obtained representation from the Arizonabased Legal Aid Society.
In September 1986, the court appointed a
social worker, Frances R. Purdie, to conduct home studies and a licensed psychologist, Dr. Barbara Liebroder, to conduct
psychological evaluations of the parties.
The case was set for trial on March 2 and
3, 1987, but, upon appellant's motion, was
continued until May 7 and 8, 1987 so that
appellant's new counsel from the Legal Aid
Society, David Hartwig, could prepare for
trial.
On February 27, 1987, respondent was
granted extended visitation with S. for forty-five days from March 4, 1987 to April 14,
1987. Liebroder evaluated S. a second time
immediately following her return from this
visitation.
On March 28, 1987, appellant married
Robert Bruce Blake in Arizona. Respondent, Purdie, and Liebroder were unaware
of her remarriage until the day before trial.
Consequently, no home or psychological
studies were done involving Blake.
Appellant's attorney, Hartwig, left the
Legal Aid Society shortly before trial. Appellant's case was then assigned to other
Legal Aid Society attorneys. Despite his
pending departure, Hartwig made no formal motion to continue the May trial date,
but, one week before trial, contacted the
judge by telephone to ask for a continuance, which the judge denied.
The matter came to trial on May 7, 8 and
12, 1987 before the same judge who had
made the initial custody award. Hartwig,
despite his departure from Legal Aid, was
present for part of the trial and conducted
much of the examination and cross-examination on the second day of the trial.
Purdie, on the basis of her home evaluations performed on the parties and their
parents, testified that S. was emotionally

deprived, and that, even though appellant
and her parents obviously cared for S.,
their concern and caring were not expressed in such a way that would help S. to
realize her full potential. She testified,
instead, that S. was being emotionally damaged in her present environment and that
she would have more of her emotional
needs met in respondent's custody.
Liebroder, who had performed psychological evaluations on each of the parties,
two on S., and a screening evaluation on
respondent's new wife, testified that appellant's drug use, because it was being treated and was currently under control, was
not appellant's most serious problem, although she had a poor prognosis for continued abstinence. Liebroder concluded that
appellant's most serious problems were
that she was extremely self-centered and
had difficulty empathizing with, understanding, and caring in a significant way
for other people, and that these were symptoms of a chronic, change-resistant character disorder. She noted no really significant interaction between appellant and S.,
who had an unusually negative self-image.
Liebroder indicated that S. appeared to
be suffering from a lack of attention and
nurturing. She stated that S.'s needs for a
structured environment, adequate stimulation, and interaction with other children
were not being met, and that she had suffered serious emotional damage while in
appellant's custody. She concluded that S.
was in serious jeopardy of sustaining permanent emotional damage along with loss
of use of her intellectual potential and personality, and had already adopted, at age
four, a very non-achieving lifestyle.
Liebroder testified that respondent, on
the other hand, had a great deal of energy
and determination to succeed and was a
disciplined person. She found that his relationship difficulties were related to his alcoholism, which was currently under control,
and that he had the ability, stability, and
structured lifestyle to be a good parent for
S. Regarding S.'s April visitation with respondent, Liebroder indicated that S. had
changed behaviorally for the better, that
her intelligence scores had jumped twenty
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points, and that these changes were not
attributable to chance, but were reflective
of the time S. had spent in respondent's
custody.
Dr. Lindeman, a psychologist hired by
appellant, testified that appellant's personality was within normal limits and that,
contrary to Liebroder's study, appellant did
not have any serious psychological or emotional problems. He indicated that he was
pleasantly surprised with S.'s relationship
with appellant, and that appellant not only
did not have the personality disorder diagnosed by Liebroder, but that Liebroder's
study did not justify such a diagnosis.1 He
also noted, however, that appellant was in
the middle to high risk range for further
drug abuse.

Utah

dence was proffered by respond<
show, in greater detail, the nature a
tent of appellant's cocaine addiction
pellant's only disallowed evidence '
letter written by her therapist and a
study performed by her counselor,
judge disallowed the letter because
lant had not timely provided it to r<
dent, and the home study because he
that the counselor was not qualified
expert

At the conclusion of the trial, cu
was transferred to respondent On
19, 1987, appellant moved for a new
and a stay of the custody order pei
appeal. On June 29, Hartwig filed an
davit indicating, among other things,
he had requested a continuance to i
Liebroder rebutted Lindeman's testimonew counsel adequate preparation time
ny, stating that he used a very cursory
that appellant had not been allowed s
battery of tests to arrive at his conclusions
as opposed to her large variety of in-depth cient time to present her case during i
tests, and because Lindeman's observation The trial court denied this motion, ord
of S. took place two weeks after she re- that the parties split the cost of the ps\
turned from visitation with respondent, the logical evaluations and home studies,
behavior he observed was attributable to nied respondent's motion for legal cost
$803.70, and approved the transfer of p
the visitation.
ical custody of S. from appellant to res]
In summary, Liebroder believed that re- dent, which was to take place on July
spondent was more likely than appellant to 1987.
remain alcohol and drug free over time.
The following issues raised by appell
Because she found that S.'s social and psyare of primary concern: (1) whether
chological needs were not being met, and
trial court erred in admitting evidence
that, at age four, she was already moving
garding both the substantial change in
into a non-achieving, manipulative life patpellant's circumstances and S.'s best inl
tern as a result of the current custodial eats, including changes in respondent's
situation with appellant, Liebroder recom- cumstances, thus failing to bifurcate i
mended that respondent take custody of S. hearing; and (2) whether the court erred
During the trial, respondent's counsel re- awarding custody to respondent, abs<
quested publication of Rudy Lema's deposi- specific factual findings.
tion rather than bringing him in as a witAppellant raised numerous additional
ness, because, at that time, he was a federal prisoner in transit to a federal peniten- sues, including the following: (1) wheth
tiary. However, the judge refused to pub- the trial court must provide written instn
lish the deposition, which he had read prior tions to expert witnesses; and (2) wheth
to trial, because respondent's counsel had the court abused its discretion by: (a) i
made no attempt to serve process on Lema. stricting appellant's proffered testimon
The court excluded some proffered evi- (b) reading depositions and reports whi<
dence during the trial. Most of this evi- were not admitted into evidence; (c) r
fusing to grant a continuance to allow nev
I. Other evidence was admitted supporting
Lindeman's conclusion: Although he did not
testify at trial, Atila Dereli, a licensed psychologist associated with appellant's outpatient drug

treatment program, prepared a written repot
and stated that appellant was a caring persoi
and was willing to take care of other people an
help them.
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ly appointed attorneys to prepare for trial;
(d) awarding custody to respondent, who
admitted that he had intentionally violated
prior court orders by hiding S. from appellant; and (e) refusing to allow new home
studies.
Respondent asserts that the trial court
erred in refusing to award him court costs.
At the outset, we note that under the
well-established standard of review for
child custody proceedings, we do not set
aside the trial court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous, but give due regard
to the opportunity of the trial judge to
ascertain the witnesses' credibility. Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 202
(Utah Ct.App.1987). A finding is clearly
erroneous if it is against the great weight
of the evidence or if we are otherwise
definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. Johnson v. Johnson,
771 P.2d 696, 697 (Utah Ct.App.1989); Power Systems and Controls, Inc. v. Keiths
Elec. Constr. Co., 765 P.2d 5, 9 (UUh
Ct.App.1988).
BIFURCATION OF PROCEEDINGS
11,21 In an unbifurcated hearing, the
judge considered evidence concerning both
parents' changed circumstances, S.'s relationship with both parents, and additional
evidence relevant to S.'s best interests. He
found that there was a material change in
appellant's circumstances because of the
serious nature of her addiction, and that
neither party had previously apprised him
that appellant was a cocaine addict and
respondent an alcoholic at the time of the
divorce. He then orally found that a
change of custody was in S.'s best interest.
Appellant asserts that in following this procedure, the trial court erroneously failed to
bifurcate the hearing pursuant to Hogge v.
Hogge, 649 P.2d 51, 53-54 (Utah 1982) and
Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah
1984), thus improperly mingling evidence of
appellant's changed circumstances and S.'s
best interests, including respondent's
changed circumstances, in the same hearing.
The Utah Supreme Court set forth in
Hogge and later clarified in Becker a two-

step procedure for modifying a custody
order: (1) the party seeking custody must
show that there has been a material change
in the custodial parent's circumstances
upon which the original custody award was
based, and (2) once a change in circumstances has been shown, the transfer of
custody must be in the child's best interests. Hogge, 649 P.2d at 53-54; Becker,
694 P.2d at 610. Usually,
the noncustodial parent's change of circumstances is relevant only to a determination of whether, under the second
prong of the Hogge-Becker test, the best
interests of the child warrant a shift in
custody, an issue reached only after a
change of custodial circumstances has
been found and the issue of custody has
been reopened.
Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d 624, 627
(Utah 1987).
In a recent decision, this court reasoned
that if an initial custody award is based
upon a thorough examination by the trial
court of the various factors relevant to the
child's "welfare, a rigid application of the
Hogge-Becker change in circumstances
test is appropriate. Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 166, 160 (Utah CtApp.
1989). In such a case, the court has already considered the child's best interests
and fashioned the custody award accordingly. Id. Any subsequent petition for
modification of custody must overcome the
high threshold set forth in Hogge "to 'protect the child from "ping-pong" custody
awards' and the accompanying instability
so damaging to a child's proper development." Id. (quoting Kramer, 738 P.2d at
626.) If, however, the initial custody decree is unlitigated, e.g., where custody is
obtained by default divorce or where the
parties stipulate as to custody, then the
trial court may focus the custody determination on the child's best interests. Maughan, 770 P.2d at 160. Subsequent to
Maughan, the Utah Supreme Court followed this same line of reasoning in Elmer
v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989), holding
that "in change of custody cases involving
a nonlitigated custody decree, a trial court,
in applying the changed circumstances test,

should receive evidence on changed circumstances and that evidence may include evidence that pertains to the best interests of
the child." Id. at 605. In such cases, the
res judicata purpose served by the
Hogge-Becker test must be subservient to
the child's best interests. Id. at 603.
The stability with which the law is primarily concerned is not the stability of
the legal custody arrangement as such,
but rather the stability that makes possible the psychological and emotional security that underlies a child's well-developed sense of self-worth and self-confid e n c e — [This stability is a means of]
promoting the ultimate objective, the
overall best interests of the child.
Id. at 604 (citations omitted). In such
cases, "[t]oo rigid an application of the
[Hogge-Becker test] would lock a child into
the custody of one parent or the other
where there has been no determination on
the merits of parenting ability of either
parent and custody has been awarded only
because of the default of one parent in
failing to oppose the complaint of the other." Id. Quoting Kramer, 738 P.2d at 629
(Howe, J., concurring)). Elmer concludes,
"In sum, we hold that in change of custody
cases involving a nonlitigated custody decree, a trial court, in applying the changedcircumstances test, should receive evidence
on changed circumstances and that evidence may include evidence that pertains to
the best interests of the child." Id. at
605.

impartial judicial examination of S
interests. In fact, evidence in the
indicates that the initial custody av
appellant was inimical to S.'s best inl
and its continuation could seriousl
ardize S.'s psychological, intellectu
emotional development. Thus, a ri,
plication of the Hogge-Becker chanj
cumstances test, as urged by appel
inappropriate here.* Therefore, w
that the trial court did not commit e
receiving evidence pertaining not (
appellant's changed circumstances b
to S.'s best interests in a non-bifi
hearing.
FACTUAL FINDINGS
Appellant next argues that we
overturn the trial court's order beci
made no specific finding that resp
was a fit and proper person to take c
of S.

The initial custody determination in this
matter was unlitigated, as was also the
case in Maughan and Elmer, because it
was stipulated to by the parties. Consequently, custody was not based upon an

13-6] This court requires that fii
of fact (1) include enough facts to di
the process through which the ul
conclusion is reached, (2) indicate th
process is logical and properly supj
and (3) be not clearly erroneous.
chant, 743 P.2d at 202-03. "A men
ing that the parties are or are not't
proper persons to be awarded the
custody, and control' of the child (
pass muster when the custody awi
challenged and an abuse of the trial c
discretion is urged on appeal." Ma
v. Martinez, 728 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah
(per curiam). The trial court should
those factors it considered in makii
determination, such as the needs c
child, the ability of each parent to

2. Taking a broader range of evidence than normally allowed under the changed-circumstances
test is appropriate in this case for an additional
reason and resolves a nagging dilemma for the
trial court. Because the evidence establishing
appellant's and respondent's respective addictions was also probative for determining S.'s
best interests and the parties' respective parenting abilities, there was no effective way to bifurcate the hearing and strictly limit the evidence
to that relating only to appellant's changed circumstances. Evidence regarding appellant's
changed circumstances dealt primarily with her

cocaine addiction and how its use im
negatively upon her care of and relati
with S. and it is relevant to both chang
cumstances and S.'s best interests. The
witnesses presented evidence relevant t<
appellant's changed circumstances and S
interests which was so intertwined that b
tion of the two issues would have done vi
to an orderly, reasonable presentation,
have created confusion and misundersta
and would have resulted in further expen
inconvenience to the witnesses and the r.
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those needs, the parenting ability of the
custodial parent, and the functioning of the
established custodial relationship. Myers
v. Myers, 768 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah Ct.App.
1989). "Failure of the trial court to make
findings on all material issues is reversible
error unless the facts in the record are
'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment' " Acton v. J.B. Deliran, 737 P.2d
996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Kinkella v.
Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)).3
[6] Although we find that the trial
court did not err in failing to bifurcate the
hearing, the supreme court has indicated
that the trial court's "findings of fact
should reflect that the court considered
stability as a factor in the custody decision
and the weight the court accorded it." Elmer, 776 P.2d at 605; see also Paryzek v.
Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78, 81-84 (Utah CtApp.
1989). The weight the trial court accords
to the stability and continuity of the existing custodial relationship will depend upon
the duration of the existing custody arrangement, the child's age, the nature of
the developing relationship between the
child and both parents, and how well the
child is thriving physically, mentally and
emotionally. Elmer, 776 P.2d at 604.
[7] The trial judge orally found that a
change of custody was in S.'s best interests
but failed to make any specific factual findings supporting this conclusion. Therefore, even though the ultimate disposition
seems abundantly reasonable under the circumstances, we are compelled to remand
the case for entry of appropriate findings
which clearly articulate the judge's considerations behind his finding that the change
of custody is in S.'s best interests.
To reduce confusion and to lessen the
possibility of an additional appeal, we address appellant's remaining issues.
3. Oral findings of fact and conclusions of law
made by the court when it rules from the bench

WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS TO
EXPERT WITNESSES
[8] Appellant claims that the trial court
erred in failing to provide written instructions to expert witnesses pursuant to Utah
Rules of Evidence 706(a), which requires
the expert witness to "be informed of his
duties by the court in writing, a copy of
which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a
conference in which the parties shall have
opportunity to participate." Our review of
the record indicates that this alleged lack
of written instructions was not objected to
nor even mentioned at the time of trial.
Further, there is no indication in the record
as to what instructions, if any, were given
to the expert witnesses. It is well established that we will not consider any issue
raised for the first time on appeal. Marchant v. Park City, 111 P.2d 677, 682
(Utah Ct.App.1989) appeal filed 106 Utah
Adv.Rep. 63 (1989). "A matter is sufficiently raised if it is submitted to the trial
court, and the court is afforded an opportunity to rule on the issue." State v. One
1979 Pontiac Trans Am, 771 P.2d 682, 684
(Utah CtApp. 1989). The trial court was
not given such an opportunity here, so we
decline to address appellant's point.
RESTRICTION OF PROFFERED
TESTIMONY
[9-12] Appellant asserts that the trial
court abused its discretion in restricting
some of her proffered testimony. Our review of the record reveals that the trial
court disallowed the following proffered
testimony: a letter from appellant's therapist on the basis that appellant had not
timely provided it to respondent, and a
home study performed by appellant's counselor at Terros on the basis that the counselor was not qualified as an expert. We
will not reverse a trial court's determination on the admissibility of proffered evidence absent an abuse of discretion affecting a party's substantial rights. Utah
R.Evid. 103; see also State v. Jamison, 767
P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct.App.1989); State v.
arc sufficient.

Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a).

Aase, 762 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Utah CtApp.
1988). The trial court does not abuse its
discretion in refusing to admit evidence
which is not timely provided to the opposing party contrary to the court's instructions. Further, "[t]he matter of qualification of an expert witness lies in the discretion of the court." State v. Locke, 688
P.2d 464, 464 (Utah 1984) (per curiam)
(footnote omitted); see also State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 33-34 (1989); State v.
Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 14 (Utah CtApp.1988).
Under the facts set forth in the record, we
do not find any abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court.
DEPOSITIONS NOT ADMITTED
INTO EVIDENCE
[13,14] Appellant claims that the trial
court abused its discretion by reading depositions and reports that it did not admit into
evidence, Rudy Lema's deposition in particular,4 suggesting that the trial court may
have improperly based its decision upon
them.
At the outset, we note that the trial
judge, upon being questioned by appellant's counsel regarding this evidence, specifically disavowed relying on it much in his
decision making process. He stated, "I
read the deposition in its entirety, and I
don't believe that's going to be a major
factor in my decision. So, I will not allow
it in, but even if it were allowed in I'm not
giving it that much weight"

his consideration his knowledge an
ment as to the materiality, compete]
effect of the evidence. In re Es
Baxter, 16 Utah 2d 284, 399 P.2d 4
(1965); see also Del Porto v. Nic
Utah 2d 286, 495 P.2d 811, 814 (197:
per Tire Market, Inc. v. Rollins, 1
2d 122, 417 P.2d 132, 136 (1966). I
cases, there is a presumption that tl
judge has disregarded all inadmissil
dence in reaching his decision. Co
v. Connolly, 209 Mont 298, 680 P.S
573 (1984). Appellant has not ovc
this presumption, so we find that th
court did not abuse its discretion h<
[15] Further, inquiry is not 1
merely to whether or not an erroi
have been committed, but whether tli
any "reasonable likelihood that the
affected the outcome of the proceed
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120
1989). Our review of the record an
proffered evidence indicates that th
puted evidence was merely cumulath
cause the critical facts surrounding i
lant's cocaine addiction and relatio
with Lema, which were brought out i
disputed evidence, were also brought (
other evidence, including appellant's
testimony. Therefore, whether or no
judge erred in refusing to admit the de
tions is immaterial.
CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL
Appellant alleges that the trial ji
abused his discretion in refusing to co
ue the trial to allow her new attorney
prepare for trial.

It is obvious that for the court to rule on
the admissibility of the evidence in question, the court must be familiar with it,
and, so, must read it. The law is well
established that where the trial is to the
court rather than to a jury, the court's
rulings on evidence need not be subjected
to as critical an inquiry because, in arriving
at his conclusions, the judge will include in

[16] The granting of a continua
rests in the sound discretion of the i
court. Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. Osbo\
622 P.2d 800, 803 (Utah 1981). The jud|
action in denying a continuance will noi
reversed on appeal unless the court

4. In his deposition, Lema testified that after the
May 19, 1986 hearing, he visited appellant in
Phoenix on four occasions. Each time, he
brought large amounts of cocaine, which he and
appellant used together. On one trip in late
June, he and appellant spent three days and two
nights in a hotel drinking alcohol and using
cocaine. He also arranged through appellant to
sell two ounces of cocaine to her brother.

Lema further testified that in September 1
appellant requested that he mail cocaine to
boyfriend in Phoenix, and that appellant ad
ted that she had been using cocaine that n
and that her boyfriend was a cocaine dealer.
Lema's opinion, appellant was addicted to
caine in spite of the treatment program,
was "strung out and wanted to get more .
more all the time."
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abused that discretion by acting unreasonably. Chrtstenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d
1375, 1377 (Utah 1988); see also Patton v.
Evans, 92 Utah 524, 69 P.2d 969, 971 (Utah
1937).
[17] In the present case, the judge had
already continued the trial at appellant's
request on one other occasion so that her
new counsel could prepare the case. Further, prosecution of the case had been substantially delayed by appellant's dilatory
conduct in failing to agree on expert witnesses and in failing to retain new counsel
in a timely manner. The trial judge had
made it clear to the parties on several
occasions that he considered time to be of
the essence, and that S.'s best interests
required the resolution of the custody dispute in as short a time as possible. Under
these circumstances, we do not find that
the trial judge acted unreasonably in refusing to grant appellant another continuance to prepare for trial. We find this and
appellant's remaining issues to be without
merit.
AWARD OF COSTS
[18,19] Respondent asserts that, as the
prevailing party, he should have been
awarded costs totaling $803.70 for filing
fees, witness fees, service fees, and reporter fees pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 54(d),
which provides, in part, that "[ejxcept
when express provision therefor is made
either in a statute of this state or in these
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to
the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." This statute leaves the
question of costs "somewhat in the discretion of the courts." Hull v. Goodman, 4
Utah 2d 163, 290 P.2d 245, 247 (1955). Further, in modification of divorce decrees pursuant to the continuing jurisdiction of the
trial court set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-5 (1984), the question of the ability
or inability of a party to pay costs in defending the matter is a factual matter
which lies in the discretion of the trial
court. Anderson v. Anderson, 13 Utah 2d
36, 368 P.2d 264, 266 (1962). There was
substantial evidence set forth in the record
as to appellant's precarious financial cir-

cumstances as compared to respondent's
relatively prosperous situation to justify
the trial court's refusal to award costs to
respondent.
We affirm the trial court on these remaining issues and find that its failure to
bifurcate the hearing was not reversible
error. We remand, however, for adequate
findings regarding the stability and continuity of appellant's custodial relationship
with S. and S.'s best interests.
DAVIDSON and ORME, JJ., concur.
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Stanley C. MANN, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
H. Wayne WADSWORTH, Watkiss, &
Campbell, and Does 1-10, Defendants
and Respondents.
No. 870211-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 20, 1989.

Former defendant in conspiracy action
brought action against attorney and attorney's law firm, alleging malicious prosecution. The District Court, Third District,
Salt Lake County, John A. Rokich, J., entered summary judgment of dismissal in
favor of firm and, on jury verdict, entered
judgment in favor of attorney. Plaintiff
appealed. The Court of Appeals, J. Robert
Bullock, Senior Judge, held that: (1) sufficient factual basis for a disqualifying trial
judge was lacking; (2) trial court erroneously applied doctrine of respondeat superior in dismissing firm; but (3) dismissal was
harmless error.
Affirmed.
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1. Judges <*»51(3)
Sufficient factual basis for disqualifying judge was lacking absent specification
of nature and time of judge's averred prior
relationship with defendant law firm; motion seeking disqualification alleged only
that judge was once "of counsel" to firm.
2. Malicious Prosecution *»42
Vicarious liability of law firm for acts
of its attorney, under doctrine of respondeat superior, did not depend on finding of
express authorization for attorney's acts
and, accordingly, trial court should not
have dismissed firm in malicious prosecution action on grounds that attorney had
not been authorized to commit act of malicious prosecution and that, therefore, acts
complained of were outside scope of attorney's employment.
3. Appeal and Error «=»1062.2
Trial court's erroneous failure to allow
jury to determine whether attorney alleged
to have engaged in malicious prosecution
was acting within scope of his employment,
so as to impose liability on attorney's employer under doctrine of respondeat superior, was harmless in light of jury's finding
that attorney was not liable; employer's
liability under respondeat superior was vicarious and did not exist apart from attorney's liability.
4. Appeal and Error «=»499(4)
Appellate court would not consider correctness of instruction for first time on
appeal absent specific objection on record
or compelling reason to do so.

Ray R. Christensen, Gainer Bd
lig, Salt Lake City, for defendan
spondents.
Before BULLOCK,1 GREENE
and NEWEY,2 JJ.
J. ROBERT BULLOCK, Judg<
Plaintiff Stanley C. Mann appei
judgment on a verdict dismissing
for malicious prosecution again
dant H. Wayne Wadsworth, an*
summary judgment of dismissal i
defendant Watkiss & Campbell,
firm.
The events leading to Mann's
gan with a dispute over cusUx
adopted minor child, David
David's adoptive parents were
and he was placed in the custxx
adoptive mother, Mann's niece,
leaving a will designating Mann
wife guardians of David. There*
Manns petitioned for their appoin
David's guardians.
However,
adoptive father, Mark Wheeler, r
ed by defendant Wadsworth of
firm of Watkiss & Campbell, confc
Manns' petition, and counterpetiti
award of the child's custody to hir
an initial temporary award of cue
mediately following the death of tl
adoptive mother, permanent cust
awarded to the child's adoptive
Mark Wheeler, and his wife Sylv

Stanley C. Mann, Salt Lake City, pro se.

Shortly after the initial hearing
custody question but before the pe
custody award, Mark Wheeler v
three times in May of 1979 at his
California. Though critically injt
survived, but was unable to idet
assailant. His present wife, Sylvi}
was an eyewitness to the shooting,
also unable to consciously identify
sailant. However, in a hypnotic ii
conducted by police, she identified i
being at the scene of the shoot
leaving in the getaway car with t
man.

I. J. Robert Bullock, Senior Judge, sitting by
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-S-24(l)(j) (1987).

2. Robert L. Newey, Senior Judge, sittir.
cial appointment pursuant to Utah C
§ 78-3-24(l)(j) (1987).

5. Appeal and Error <8=»199, 499(1)
Appellate court was not in position to
consider alleged deficiencies in discovery
where such deficiencies were not called to
attention of trial court or made part of
record.

